NWW's conceptual framework of limited and open access orders provides a useful tool for political economy approach that integrates developments in both the polity and the economy. NWW recognizes the interdependence of political system and economic system. Their theory of double balance posits that, over the long-term, the degree of political openness tends to match with that of economic openness and vice versa. I will show that Korea developed from a fragile LAO (1945-48) to basic LAO (1948-60) to a basic/mature LAO (1960 LAO ( -1987 to a mature LAO with doorstep conditions (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) , and has been making a transition to an OAO since 1997. Also, I will provide an account of how successful control of violence has been established and how different mix of rents for the dominant coalition has developed over time.
Although the focus of the chapter is Korea, I will briefly present some comparison of Korea with Taiwan as another successful case and the Philippines as an unsuccessful case to explore what made it possible for Korea (and Taiwan) to make a transition to an OAO.
Back in the 1950s, the Philippines appeared more promising in terms of both economic and political development than Korea and Taiwan. A comparison of these three countries provides insights about the distinct early features of Korea and Taiwan that positively influenced their subsequent development. The comparison illustrates the crucial role of sweeping land reform in Korea and Taiwan, which is rarely seen in other countries, except in Japan.
The chapter demonstrates the usefulness of NWW's and NWWW's conceptual framework in explaining the post-colonial development of Korea. It also suggests that the doorstep conditions do not work the same way in today's developing countries as they did in the historical experiences of Western Europe and North America. The chapter closes with a brief discussion of the challenges Korea faces to complete the transition and consolidate its OAO.
H.2: History

H2.1 Origin of the Korean "Developmental State"
Previous explanations of Korean development focused on the role of state vs. market.
While some studies emphasize the role of market and trade liberalization (McKinnon 1973; World Bank 1987) , the "developmental state" explanation became dominant in light of the mounting evidence for the interventionist role of the Korean state (Amsden 1989; Haggard 1990; Chang 1994) . This group of scholars stress the importance of an autonomous and meritocratic bureaucracy as the core of developmental state, and the role of Park Chung-hee in establishing it. Mo-Weingast also follow the key arguments of the developmental state literature. They argue that Korea's transition to open access order started with the "developmental state" under Park's leadership in the early 1960s. They characterize Syngman Rhee's regime as "predatory state" in agreement with most of the developmental state literature.
A weakness in this literature is the lack of adequate explanation about the origin of developmental state. What made it possible for Korea (and Taiwan) to establish "developmental state" unlike other developing countries? What explains the transformation from a predatory state (Rhee regime) to a developmental state (Park regime)?
Some scholars suggest a historical explanation: the Confucian tradition of bureaucracy and Japanese colonial experience (Woo-Cumings 1995) . Others suggest the role of security threat. These explanations are plausible, since they distinguish Korea (and Taiwan) from other developing countries, and Mo-Weingast subscribe to these explanations. The historical experience of Confucian statecraft and bureaucratic traditions helped to build coherent and meritocratic bureaucracy in Korea. The security threat from North Korea gave South Korean leaders incentives to pursue long-term growth rather than short-term rents. Neither explanation of the developmental state, however, can explain the differences between Rhee's and Park's regimes. Why didn't the Confucian bureaucratic tradition and security threat lead President Rhee to form a developmental state?
In fact, Korea's conditions in the early 1960s were more favorable for economic growth than those of most developing countries (Rodrik 1995; Benabou 1996; MoWeingast, 65; Eichengreen 2009 ). Korea had unusually equal distribution of income and wealth and a high level of human capital when the Park regime began its export-led industrialization drive. These conditions were critical. As Rodrik (1995) notes, the exceptionally low levels of inequality in Korea (and Taiwan) made it possible for the state bureaucracy to be autonomous and free from capture by powerful economic interests. As Eichengreen (2009) points out, Korea's high primary education enrollment and completion rate circa 1960 provided a labor force equipped with basic numeracy and literacy, which was well suited to the circumstances of a relatively poor, lateindustrializing economy. Park's industrialization drive would not have been so successful without these favorable conditions. These conditions were not inherited from Japanese colonial period, but were the result of the land reform circa 1950. The sweeping land reform dissolved the landed elite and produced an unusually equal distribution of wealth and income. It also helped to rapidly expand education by enabling most people to afford to educate their children.
These conditions in turn helped to establish coherent and meritocratic bureaucracy by providing a pool of highly educated people to compete in higher civil service exams and by removing powerful landlords who could capture or corrupt the bureaucracy for their own economic interests. Thus, land reform contributed to widening economic openness.
H2.2 South Korea, 1945 to the Present: Chronology
South Korea's post-colonial history (1945-present) can be divided into five periods.
South Korea developed from a fragile LAO (1945-48) to basic LAO (1948-60) to a basic/mature LAO (1960 LAO ( -1987 to a mature LAO with doorstep conditions (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) , and has been making a transition to an OAO since 1997. When Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, it was primarily an agricultural economy with few landlords and a vast number of peasants. The richest 2.7 percent of rural households owned two thirds of all the cultivated lands, while 58 percent owned no land at all. A radical land reform took place first in North Korea in 1946, which gave landlords no compensation and distributed lands to peasants for free.
The most important source of fragility and instability during the period of American
Military Government (1945-48) was the land problem. Immediately after the liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, leftist forces had strong political influence as well as violence potential. By the time when South Korean state was established in 1948, these groups were weakened considerably partly because of suppression but also because of the government's commitment to land reform. Although there were some partisan guerillas in the mountains, they were completely eliminated during the Korean War. A state monopoly on violence was established and there were no powerful groups, other than the military, who possessed serious violence potential that could threaten the state. Also, remarkable was that Korean peninsula maintained peace and the two Korean governments never attempted to launch another war despite the mutual hostility and tensions that dominated inter-Korean relations up to the present.
Land redistribution in South Korea was carried out in two stages: by the American Military Government (AMG) in 1948 and by the South Korean government from 1950 to 1952. In March 1948, the AMG began to distribute 240,000 hectares of former Japanese lands to former tenants, which accounted for 11.7 percent of total cultivated land. When the first election was held in the South in May 1948, all parties pledged to implement land reform and the Constitution included a commitment to land reform. Syngman Rhee's government began to implement agrarian land reform in 1950, just before the Korean War broke out. Restricting the upper ceiling of landownership to three hectares, the government redistributed 330,000 hectares of farmland by 1952. The landlords received 1.5 times the annual value of all crops in compensation from the government, and their former tenants were to pay the same amount to the government in five years.
2 In anticipation of the reforms, about 500,000 hectares had been sold directly by landlords to their tenants, the bulk in 1948 and 1949 (Hong 2001 . In total, ownership of 52 percent of total cultivated land was transferred to tenants and the "principle of land to tillers" was realized. By 1956, the top 6 percent owned only 18 percent of the cultivated lands.
Tenancy dropped from 49 percent to 7 percent of all farming households, and the area of cultivated land under tenancy fell from 65 percent to 18 percent (Ban, Moon, and Perkins 1980; Lie 1998; Putzel 1992) .
Land reform profoundly transformed Korean society. The traditional Yangban (aristocracy) landlord class was dissolved. Peasants became farmers (Lie 1998) . Land redistribution and the destruction of large private properties during the Korean War produced an unusually equal distribution of assets and income in Korea (Mason et al. 1980; You 1998 Land reform also contributed to rapid expansion of education by making it affordable to a majority of population. Enrollment in primary schools doubled between 1945 and 1955, while enrollment in secondary schools increased more than eight times, and enrollment in colleges and universities increased ten times (Kwon 1984) . Considering that government's budgetary commitment to public education was minimal during that period, the speed of educational expansion would have been slower without land reform.
It was common that many farmers with small landholdings sold their lands to support their children's college education.
The spectacular increase in an educated labor force not only contributed to high economic growth, but also paved the road for the establishment of meritocratic bureaucracy. Although the higher civil service exam (Haengsi) was instituted as early as 1949, only 4 percent of those filling higher entry-level positions came in via the exam under Syngman Rhee's government . The higher positions were filled primarily through special appointments. This reflected not only Rhee's reliance on clientelistic ties but also a shortage of a pool of highly educated people (Kang 2002) . Park Chung-hee's government (1961-79), however, was able to establish a meritocratic bureaucracy manned by the supply of enough university-educated people, although he still allocated a substantial part of the higher ranks to the military who did not pass the highly competitive civil service exam (You 2008 ).
An important question for this period is why the Rhee regime chose to implement the sweeping land reform and why it was so successful, in contrast to other developing Party. Using political connections, they borrowed money from the banks in order to make bids for the ownership of the same banks (Lim 2003, 42 Rhee's Liberal Party was essentially nothing more than his personal networks (Lee 1968, 71-76; Lie 1998, 35) . It is notable that the Liberal Party did not have any class base, while the leading opposition, the Democratic Party's initial base was the landed class.
Since the landed class was dissolved after the land reform and the Korean War, the came from the military. The KCIA, which was notorious for its persecution of dissidents and violation of human rights, began as a corps of 3,000 officers dedicated to military rule (Kim 1971, 111-12) . The DRP's major platforms were economic development and anti-communism. It did not have any class base, and the military officers that constituted the leadership of the DRP were from humble social backgrounds. Over time, however, the DRP forged an alliance with the chaebols. It was structured along a hierarchical, single command system with a large staff, modeled on Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan.
Park had to dispense patronage to military officers not only to utilize their loyalty for governing but also to prevent any revolt from within the military. As the single most powerful group with violence potential, the military enjoyed bulk of appointments in the cabinet and high-level government positions as well as the KCIA and the DRP. Constitution gave him an authority to nominate a third of the National Assemblymen, which guaranteed an absolute majority seats to the ruling Democratic Republican Party.
Park issued many Emergency Measures, which were used to suppress criticism of the Yushin Constitution and his dictatorship.
Even when presidential and National Assembly elections were regularly held, they
were far from open and competitive. Anti-communism rhetoric was conveniently used to suppress dissidents. The National Security Law was frequently abused to persecute dissidents, and Korean CIA and police were used to suppress anti-government activities.
In addition, vote-buying and fraudulent counting limited the scope of real contestation through elections. It is notable, however, anti-dictatorship student movement continued to Although I've described this period (1960-87) as a long journey to democracy, the period is better known as a period of economic take-off, or export-led industrialization.
Korea was not only poorer than most countries in Latin America, but also than some countries in Africa when it began export-led growth in the 1960s. In 1960, Korea was much poorer than Mexico and Argentina and somewhat poorer than the Philippines and Senegal, but today it is much richer than any of these countries (Table 2) . Korea has enjoyed sustained economic growth with average annual growth rate of 6% since 1960. Indeed, it has not experienced negative growth except for three years during this long period: slightly negative growth (-0.7%) in 1962 after the 1961 military coup led by General Park Chung-hee, -5.8% growth in1980 in the midst of political turmoil after President Park's assassination and with the second oil shock, and -9.0% growth in 1998 with the financial crisis. The change of the Korean government's strategy from promoting import substitution industry to encouraging and subsidizing export industries contributed to boosting exports and raising productivity. To be sure, the economic system was nowhere near operating on the principle of open access and competition, either internally or externally. Externally, imports were discouraged and strictly regulated with high tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
Foreign direct investment was strictly restricted, although foreign loans were sought for enthusiastically. Internally, the government owned and controlled commercial banks and distributed under-priced credit to favored firms and industries, to reward export performance but also in exchange with political donations.
Creation and distribution of rents was common not only under Syngman Rhee's regime, but also under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan's rule. Eradication of corruption was one of key demands of the April Student Revolution in 1960, and Park initially announced anti-corruption as a top priority as Chun did in 1980 to justify the military takeover. Immediately after the coup of May 16, 1961, the military junta arrested chaebol owners on charges of illicit wealth accumulation, but the investigation ended with a negotiation on the political and economic terms between the military and business owners. The junta not only reduced the fines for illicit wealth accumulation, but also provided financial subsidies for those industrialists who pledged to undertake specific industrial projects and to provide political funds (Kim and Im 2001 ). An important punishment, however, was confiscation of equity shares in commercial banks, which in effect renationalized the banks that had been privatized in the late 1950s (Lim 2003, 44 ).
This episode shows that the military junta led by Park Chung-hee was eager to fill their "legitimacy deficit" that came from the overthrow of a legitimate democratic government by showcasing their will to fight corruption on the one hand and by forging a partnership with the business to propel industrialization and economic growth on the other hand. After the Student Revolution in 1960, the short-lived Chang Myon government proclaimed its "Economy First" policy and was preparing a launch of an Economic Development Plan (Lee 1968). Park realized that sustained military rule would not be possible without good economic performance and that he needed the business as an ally for economic growth as well as a source of political funds. Since he did not want an equal partnership with the business, however, he seized firm control of the banks that would enable him to direct the incipient chaebols to invest in the sectors and industries according to the state plans. Thus, a system of rent exchanges between the government, banks, and chaebols was formed in early years of Park and it lasted until the East Asian financial crisis hit the Korean economy hard in 1997.
Under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, the most important forms of rents were allocation of low-interest-rate domestic and foreign loans. The government favored chaebol firms and exporters in the distribution of rents in return for their political contributions, and often protected their monopoly by restricting entry of other firms in specific industries. During the 1960s export performance provided the government with a relatively objective criterion for under-priced credit allocation, while during the heavy and chemical industrialization drive in the 1970s government support was more based on industry than on export performance. Since chaebol firms were primary exporters and pioneers in HCI drive, chaebol expanded rapidly under Park's regime and the problem of too-big-to-fail began to emerge.
Typically, a firm that gets governmental approval for an industrial project will be financed by one-fifth equity and four-fifths foreign and domestic loans. It also receives other subsidies such as tax exemption. If the project becomes successful, the firm starts a new line of business with the profits. Once again, the firm will not put up much equity but will rely heavily on external debt. The extension of this process leads to a group of firms, or chaebol (Jones and Sakong 1980, 273-4) .
There were substantial differences in the importance of rent-seeking and patronage between import substitution and export-oriented industrialization strategies, however.
Under an import substitution policy, government protection and favors were decisive for the profitability of businesses. Under an export-oriented policy, however, firms had to compete in foreign markets. Although various forms of favors and subsidies helped the firms to compete in foreign markets, productivity and competitiveness became increasingly important. Also, the government's discretion was constrained, because they had to reward export performance, not just political loyalty and contributions. Thus, rentseeking and corruption were contained within certain limits, and the bureaucracy exercised discretion based on impersonal rather than personalistic or clientelistic criteria (Mo-Weingast).
As the size and power of the chaebol grew, Chun Doo-hwan government began to take measures for gradual economic liberalization. The government began to liberalize imports gradually at U.S. request, but it also began to liberalize financial markets by reducing regulations of nonbank financial institutions, many of which had long been controlled by chaebol groups. In addition, some measures such as enactment of Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act were introduced to counter the market power of the chaebol, but these measures were not vigorously implemented. Interestingly, chaebol grew even bigger and concentration increased further as a result of liberalization measures. Combined sales of top ten chaebols, as percent of GDP, grew from 15.1% in 1974 to 32.8% in 1979 32.8% in to 67.4% in 1984 32.8% in (Amsden 1989 . Thus, the Korean economy was increasing openness and competition on some dimensions, but increasing chaebol concentration and the collusion between the political and business elites limited access and competition on other dimensions. During this period, property right protection was not given to everyone equally. For example, President Park issued an Emergency Decree for Economic Stability and Growth to bail out the overleveraged chaebol in 1971, which transformed curb market loans into bank loans to be repaid over five years at lower interest rates, with a grace period of three years during which curb market loans were to be frozen. Out of 209,896 persons who registered as creditors, 70 percent were small lenders with assets in the market below 1 million won, or $2,890 (Woo 1991: 109-115; Kim and Im 2001) . Thus, the state ignored and violated property right of a large number of small creditors to save the chaebol.
Not all chaebols were treated equally, either. President Chun used the Industrial Rationalization to punish un-supportive chaebols and to favor the connected and supportive chaebols. The Kukje Group, then the seventh largest chaebol, was dissolved and Kukje's 23 affiliates were given to poorly performing chaebols that gave Chun large bribes or had family ties with him. Kukje Group's owner, Yang Jung-mo, was known to have refused to pay large bribes. Thus, property rights of firms outside of winning coalition, particularly firm owners who paid few bribes or had ties with the opposition were very insecure (Schopf 2004 ).
H.2.5 Mature LAO with doorstep conditions (1987-97):
The land reform and export-led industrialization not only contributed to opening access to economic activities but also created increasing pressures for political opening by expanding education and the middle class over time. In addition, the security threat declined as South Korea became far superior to North Korea in terms of economic and military power (including US military support) and security could no longer be used to justify the authoritarian regime, along with the decline of anti-communism rhetoric that had been used to suppress dissident movements. Although the first democratic transition The rapid increase in political opening brought about demands for further economic opening. On the one hand, business demanded deregulation. In particular, the chaebols sought to weaken or remove regulations on the chaebols such as the credit control system and restrictions on total equity investment, based on Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. On the other hand, there was a growing concern about economic concentration by the chaebols and collusion between political elites and chaebols.
When Park Chung-hee chose to favor the chaebols as a vehicle for export industry, the incipient chaebols were weak. The government was strong enough to direct their investment decisions, as the heavy and chemical industrialization drive of the 1970s demonstrated. Although the Park and Chun regimes increasingly relied on informal political contributions from the chaebols, they were still able to maintain strong government discipline on business. After the democratic transition, however, politicians' dependence on campaign funds increased chaebol's political influence and government discipline of large businesses weakened. The ruling party still maintained close connections with the chaebols, and the opposition was often divided and lacked independent sources of political funds. The political parties were still weak in terms of presenting clear programmatic appeals, and political competition centered on personal appeals and regional cleavages that had formed from unbalanced regional development during the authoritarian era. In addition, growth of Korean economy in size and technology made it increasingly difficult for the government to control the private sector.
While the chaebols grew during the authoritarian era and continued to expand in both economic and political influence after democratization, political and social organizations that could counterbalance chaebol influence were not so strong because of the stunted growth of civil society under the authoritarian regimes (Mo-Weingast) . This imbalance of power led to economic policy that was more responsive to chaebol's demands than to popular demand for chaebol reform. The government was unable to contain the chaebol's moral hazard, and their incentives to become too big to fail (TBTF) led to overinvestment and over-borrowing, including excessive short-term foreign debt. The Kim Young-sam government's (1993-98) capital market account liberalization and deregulation of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) encouraged the chaebols to finance their overly ambitious investment through their affiliated NBFIs and international capital markets. Although Korean economy was growing continuously after democratization, it became vulnerable to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 after a series of bankruptcies of over-leveraged chaebols.
H.2.6 Transition to an OAO (1997-present):
The financial crisis of 1997 was a critical test for whether Korea would revert back to a more limited access order or make a real transition to an open access order. The economic crisis might have made Koreans blame the inefficiency of democratic political institutions and policy making processes and revive nostalgia for authoritarian rule. Note that several countries in Latin America over the last century and a half moved closer to the doorstep conditions but moved away when crises brought a return of the military to politics or undermined rule of law (NWW).
In this regard, the election of Kim Dae-jung in 1998 as president in a closely contested race in the midst of financial crisis was a significant event. Kim had been a long-time opposition leader. Ten years later, Koreans made another change of government by electing conservative candidate Lee Myung-bak as president. These two changes of government, from conservative to liberal (1998) and from liberal to conservative (2008), satisfied the so-called "two turn over test" for democratic consolidation. As I noted earlier, the military exercised restraint in both elections.
President Kim Dae-jung pursued the "parallel development of democracy and market economy" and declared the end of government-business collusion or crony capitalism. He launched the so-called 'IMF-plus', a comprehensive reform program that went beyond the IMF-mandated reforms (You 2009 ). External liberalization, including a full-fledged opening of financial markets, selling-off troubled financial institutions to foreign investors, lifting foreign exchange regulations, and radical liberalization of inward foreign investment was carried out. Structural reforms were carried out in the financial, corporate, labor and public sectors. The chaebol reforms sought to enhance transparency and accountability in corporate governance and accounting practices. Financial reform strengthened the financial safety net and consolidated financial supervisory functions. Also, the government quickly expanded the social safety net such as unemployment insurance, health insurance, national pension system, and public assistance for the poor. There is a concern that the Lee Myung-bak government (2008-13) is retreating from the economic and political reforms of the previous governments. There are signs that rule of law is weakening recently as the legally guaranteed terms for public offices who were appointed under the previous government are not respected. Government intervention in the market is still occurring arbitrarily as in the case of attempted price control for necessity goods. Human rights groups such as Amnesty International have expressed concerns on the retrogression of freedom of press and freedom of expression more generally under the new government. However, it is very unlikely that Korea will go back to the authoritarian era again, because the political system is competitive and civil society has grown strong.
7 Both the major conservative party and the major liberal party has changed its name and gone through reorganizations including splits and mergers for the last two decades. The conservative Grand National Party has developed from Chun Doo-hwan's Democratic Justice Party, which merged with the opposition parties led by Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil in 1991. The Democratic Liberal Party created by threeparty merger changed its name to New Korea Party and again to Grand National Party. The liberal "Democratic Party" has developed from the Party for Peace and Democracy that Kim Dae-jung created before the 1987 presidential election. It has reorganized itself and changed its name several times to National Congress for New Politics, to New Millennium Democratic Party, to Uri Party, and to Democratic Party.
H.3: Reflections on the LAO-OAO Framework and the Korean Case
Having briefly reviewed the post-colonial history of South Korea with the lens of LAO-OAO framework, this section discusses a few key issues of the framework with regard to the Korean case.
H.3.1: Open access and economic development:
One of the disturbing facts about Korea's economic development is that the miraculous economic take-off and sustained growth took place under the authoritarian Table 6 .2).
H3.2: Theory of the double balance:
NWW propose a theory of the double balance, which suggests that economic and political systems both tend to be open access or limited access. This implies that sustaining fundamental changes in either the economic or political system cannot occur without fundamental changes in the other.
They also emphasize that the formal institutions work differently depending on the social order in which they are embedded. When the institutional forms of an OAO are transplanted to a LAO, the logic of the LAO bends them to the purpose of rent-creation to sustain the existing dominant coalition. This argument can be interpreted to imply that the formal institutions of democracy will not work well in a limited access economy and that formal institutions of the market economy will work differently in a limited access political system. Indeed, the right question to ask is how Korea was able to develop democracy in a couple of generations. And the answer is the relative openness in the economy, which was created primarily by land reform.
H.3.3: Rents and corruption:
NWW's key claim is that, in a limited access society, violence is contained by creating economic rents for powerful individuals and groups. They suggest that the types of rent as well as their effects on economic development tend to change from a fragile to basic to mature LAO and to an OAO, in which Schumpeterian innovative rents dominate. They note that patronage and corruption will be more prevalent in LAOs than in OAOs, because creation and distribution of rents will involve patronage and corruption. LAO (1948-60) Redefinition of property rights (land reform) US aid, vested properties, import license, foreign exchanges Basic/Mature LAO (1960-87) protection (learning), credit rationing, monopoly, land speculation Mature LAO (1987-97) monopoly, land speculation, protection (learning), credit rationing, Schumpeterian Transition to an OAO (1997-) Schumpeterian, monopoly, land speculation
Creation and distribution of rents by the government as well as corruption and rentseeking activities were ubiquitous throughout the post-independence history of Korea.
The most prevalent types of rent changed over time. During the 1950s, American aid was the most important source of rents. Allocation of import licenses and foreign exchanges was also important under the import substitution industrialization strategy.
During the early era of export-led industrialization centered on light industry in the 1960s and heavy and chemical industry in the 1970s, government-provided protection from internal and external competition, combined with various subsidies in the form of under-priced credit rationing and tax exemptions, was the most important source of rents.
Over time, monopoly rents became increasingly important as the chaebol's market power grew. Also, land speculation became an important source of rents as land prices tended to rise more than the overall prices. Lastly, Schumpeterian innovative rents have been growing recently as Korean economy is increasingly heading towards high-tech industry.
Different types of rents can have different effects on economic development.
Apparently, the protection rents for infant industry largely translated to learning rents in Korea, as Khan and Jomo (2000) argued. Since protection from competition was not permanent, these protected firms eventually had to compete in global markets. Although the distribution of rents did involve corrupt exchanges, the degree of corruption was not too high because the government rewarded export performance rather than simply favoring high-bribe givers. However, corrupt exchanges between the top of the government (including corrupt Presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo) and the chaebols grew over time until the mid-1990s. 
H.3.4: Doorstep conditions:
NWW and NWWW suggested that there are three (necessary but not sufficient) doorstep conditions for a transition to OAO: 1) rule of law for elites, 2) support for perpetuallylived organizations for elites, and 3) centralized political control of organizations with violence potential.
As I noted earlier, Korea came to meet these three conditions after the democratic transition in 1987.
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It is interesting to compare the levels of corruption in Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) tell that Taiwan was the least corrupt, the Philippines the most corrupt, and Korea in between. 10 BI ratings range between 1 (most corrupt) and 10 (least corrupt), and CPI ranges between 0 (most corrupt) and 10 (least corrupt). Both BI ratings (1980-83) and TI ratings for various periods (1980-85, 1988-92, and 1995-2008) consistently show that the Philippines was perceived to be much more corrupt than Korea and Taiwan.
Between Korea and Taiwan, Korea was perceived to be somewhat more corrupt than My findings suggest that external threat and competition has played an important role.
The communist threat from North Korea helped the land reform, and the fierce competition with North Korea helped to check extreme forms of rent-seeking and corruption. The export-led growth strategy exposed the South Korean firms to global competition, which limited the importance of collusive rent-seeking and promoted learning and innovation rents.
Comparison of the Korean experience with those of Taiwan and the Philippines reveals the critical importance of land reform. In Taiwan, the success of land reform under the communist threat of mainland China also helped to remove privileged landed class and to develop economy without excessive distributive struggle, which made the democratic transition and consolidation processes smooth. In the Philippines, however, the initial failure of land reform in the absence of external threat led to continuous distributive struggles, which has made democratic consolidation difficult and helped the insurgencies to continue.
The chapter also suggests that the doorstep conditions may not work the same way in today's developing countries as they did in the historical experiences of Western Europe and North America. Whereas the rule of law was established for elites first and expanded to broader population over time in the history of Western Europe and North America, it developed at the same time for both elites and non-elites in Korea.
